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Abstract 
Previous research has established that people’s resources and action capabilities influence 
visual perception, and for example, make hills appear more or less steep. What has remained 
unexamined, however, is whether perception also changes when an action is impending. We 
propose that when action is expected in an environment that is challenging because it poses 
high energetic costs, perceptual estimates are increased. Experiment 1 showed that motor 
movements of approach led to steeper slant estimates than motor movements of avoidance, 
but only if participants were in good physical condition and thus capable of undertaking 
costly actions. Experiment 2 used a mindset priming task and found that approach resulted in 
higher slant estimates than either avoidance, or a neutral control condition, again for 
participants who were in good, but not for those in poor physical condition. Experiment 3 
further showed that the approach cue on its own had the same effect as when combined with 
instructions that climbing was involved, thus suggesting that approach manipulations indeed 
implied the action of climbing. However, the effect of approach disappeared when climbing 
was explicitly ruled out. We suggest that inflated perceptual visual estimates in the face of 
challenging environments are adaptive because they discourage future actions that may be 
costly to perform. 
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When Perception Says “No” to Action:                                                                   
Approach Cues Make Steep Hills Appear Even Steeper 
Traditional theories of perception assume that viewing objects in the environment 
involves visual processes independent of a person’s bodily states and abilities (Pylyshyn, 
2003). For example, how people see a chair is considered no different from how they see the 
table next to it, or the ceiling above it. This view was challenged by Gibson (1979), who 
proposed that people perceive their environment in terms of affordances, or the opportunities 
it provides for undertaking an action. For example, a chair affords the immediate action of 
sitting on it, a table instead affords placing objects on it, but a ceiling does not afford much in 
terms of specific actions. In recent years, this notion has been investigated by researchers 
interested in how affordances in the environment influence people’s visual perception relative 
to their bodily states and abilities (Proffitt, 2006). 
Affordances and the Perception of Spatial Layout 
The economy of action account proposes that the perception of the environment is 
influenced by a person’s bodily potential to pursue the actions this environment affords 
(Proffitt, 2006; Witt, 2011). For example, a hill appears steeper when a heavy backpack 
makes it harder for a person to climb up (Bhalla & Proffitt, 1999). Although the fundamental 
premise of the account has been investigated in relation to height (Stefanucci & Proffitt, 2009; 
Harber, Yeung, & Iacovelli, 2011) and distance perception (Proffitt, Stefanucci, Banton, & 
Epstein, 2003; Witt, Proffitt, & Epstein, 2004, 2010), its initial support comes from studies 
investigating how the perception of hills is influenced by a person’s potential to climb them. 
These studies have yielded the consistent finding that resources that increase a person’s 
potential to act decrease perceived hill slant relative to a lack of such resources. This includes 
physiological resources, such as glucose (Schnall, Zadra, & Proffitt, 2010), or psychosocial 
resources, such as social support (Schnall, Harber, Stefanucci, & Proffitt, 2008), positive 
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mood (Riener, Stefanucci, Proffitt, & Clore, 2011), or the motivation to reduce cognitive 
dissonance (Balcetis & Dunning, 2007). 
In this sense, research on the economy of action has predominantly focused on the 
factors that make action in a given environment either easy or difficult, and how they shape 
perception accordingly. Indeed, when explaining attributes that underlie the economy of 
action, Proffitt and Linkenauger (2013) summarize the research on the influence of bodily 
phenotype and its three components: morphology, physiology, and behavioral repertoire. 
These components determine the bodily potential relative to affordances of the surrounding 
environment and hence influence perception when a person anticipates performing an action. 
For example, when an object is placed on a table, the person’s arm length (morphology), 
movements that can possibly be performed with the arm (behavioral repertoire), and energy 
available for moving the arm (physiology) will determine the actions that can be performed 
with the object and in turn, all these factors influence perception. What has not been 
investigated, however, is whether perception changes even when the attributes that underlie 
the potential of a person to undertake an action are held constant, and the action itself is about 
to happen. In other words, when an actor approaches a specific action in a physical 
environment, does the visual perception of this environment change? 
People constantly evaluate the environment in terms of affordances, even when no 
action is planned (e.g. Jeannerod, 2001, 2006). This is adaptive because it enables a person to 
build a behavioral repertoire that will allow appropriate responses when an action becomes 
likely. For example, merely observing an object that is graspable with the right hand prepares 
a person to respond more readily with this hand compared to the left hand when pressing a 
button to make categorization judgments about the object (Tucker & Ellis, 1998). Further, 
hills generally appear steeper than they actually are because climbing them is costly in terms 
of bodily resources, and overestimating the actual slant may discourage the behavior of 
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climbing (Proffitt, Bhalla, Gossweiler, & Midgett, 1995; Proffitt, Creem, & Zosh, 2001). 
Thus, when approaching an action in a physically demanding environment, it would be 
adaptive to view this environment as even more challenging, to discourage the action unless 
performing it is absolutely necessary. Therefore, when the action of climbing is impending, 
steep hills should appear even steeper. 
Approach and Avoidance Cues 
How can one imply that an action is about to happen without making it explicit and 
creating demand characteristics (Orne, 1962)? Research has found that certain motor 
behaviors signal an impending action regarding a stimulus even when the person is not 
consciously aware of it. For example, just flexing an arm in a pulling motion (Cacioppo, 
Priester, & Berntson, 1993; Centerbar & Clore, 2006) is a signal of approaching a stimulus, 
whereas extending an arm in a pushing motion is a signal of avoiding it. Accordingly, 
researchers have proposed that such motor movements constitute cues for approach and 
avoidance actions because they, through previous behavioral associations, became linked to 
engaging with a stimulus, or disengaging from it. Further, approach and avoidance cues such 
as arm movements induce identical psychological and behavioral effects as actual physical 
movements towards or away from a stimulus. For example, people respond more rapidly to 
positive words associated with approach compared to negative words associated with 
avoidance when flexing their arm, whereas this response pattern reverses for arm extension 
(Chen & Bargh, 1999). These effects also occur when literally pushing or pulling valenced 
words (Van Dantzig, Pecher, & Zwaan, 2008). Furthermore, when people are presented with 
words on a computer screen that appear as moving towards them, they categorize positive 
words faster than negative words, whereas the opposite is the case when words appear as 
moving away. An analogous effect occurs when people flex versus extend their arm while 
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observing static words (Neumann & Strack, 2000). These and similar findings suggest that 
arm flexion versus extension serve as powerful approach versus avoidance cues. 
Although motor movements such as arm flexion serve as cues for approaching a 
stimulus and undertaking the behavior it affords, they do not necessarily lead to this behavior. 
Indeed, a person may interpret these cues as appropriate and undertake the behavior only 
when it has energetic benefits. For example, participants who flexed their arm consumed 
more foods and drinks high in caloric energy, such as cookies or orange juice, than 
participants who extended their arm or were in a control condition (Förster, 2003). In contrast, 
arm flexion did not increase consumption of energetically neutral lukewarm water. Thus, if 
energetically non-beneficial actions are generally avoided, it may be that approach cues 
associated with such actions are invalidated by the regulatory mechanism of visual perception, 
to prevent the action from occurring. In line with this assumption, performing an approach 
cue while observing a steep hill should lead to steeper slant estimates relative to avoidance, 
and this perceptual change may in turn serve to prevent the energetically costly action of 
climbing.  
A person considering an energetically demanding behavior such as climbing has to 
possess the resources required for it. People whose energetic potential is relatively high 
because they are in good physical condition, young, or without heavy load see inclines as less 
steep than those in poor physical condition, and thus they may be more encouraged to climb 
them (Bhalla & Proffitt, 1999). Indeed, people with these characteristics are also more likely 
to undertake demanding action such as climbing stairs in shopping malls (Eves, 2013). Based 
on this research we predict that approach should inflate perceptual estimates only for people 
in good physical condition because they possess the necessary resources and therefore 
undertaking the action of climbing is a real possibility, whereas it is less feasible for people in 
poor physical condition. Thus, for people who are in good shape approach implies that 
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engaging in this behavior is highly likely, so it would be adaptive if visual perception were to 
discourage it given the high energetic cost. In contrast, for people who are not in good shape 
approach cues should not influence visual perception because the behavior of climbing is 
unlikely to occur in the first place. Thus, people in a state of approach while looking at a 
steep hill may see it as even steeper only when they are physically capable of responding to 
its affordance. 
In order to investigate the relationship between action cues and visual perception of a 
geographical environment, the present research assessed how people viewed a steep hill 
while engaging in approach or avoidance induced by simple motor movements (Experiment 1) 
or by mindset priming (Experiment 2). Further, we tested whether the influence of approach 
on visual perception of hill slant is indeed due to its implied meaning of an impending action 
of climbing (Experiment 3), and whether the effect was abolished if this implication is called 
into question.  
Experiment 1 
Experiment 1 tested whether people performing arm flexion as a cue for approach see a 
steep hill differently than people performing arm extension as a cue for avoidance. Assuming 
an adaptive role of visual perception to discourage actions that carry high metabolic costs, we 
hypothesized that arm flexion, a motor movement that signals an impending behavior 
afforded by the hill, should increase perceived hill slant relative to arm extension, a motor 
movement that signals absence of this behavior. Because people in poor physical condition 
perceive inclines as steeper than those in good physical condition (Bhalla & Proffitt, 1999) 
and are relatively less likely to perform costly behaviors (Eves, 2013), we further 
hypothesized that this influence should occur only for people in good physical condition. We 
decided to assess physical condition using a questionnaire item rather than a more objective 
measure (e.g. body mass index). Although such assessment of physical condition may not 
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clearly distinguish between participants’ subjective mental states and their actual fitness 
levels, we assumed that participants’ self-reports would more accurately capture their ability 
to perform costly actions in the given situation and thus determine the influence of approach 
versus avoidance on slant perception.  Furthermore, because previous hill studies (e.g. Proffitt 
et al., 1995; Bhalla & Proffitt, 1999) assessed two functionally distinct components of 
perception, one related to explicit awareness of the environment and another related to visual 
guidance of bodily movements, we first need to explain how the present hypothesis pertains 
to each of the two.    
Explicit Awareness versus Visual Guidance of Behavior 
Visual perception reflecting explicit awareness of the environment is controlled by the 
ventral stream (Milner & Goodale, 1995; Creem & Proffitt, 2001) and is involved in the 
process of action planning (Glover, 2004). Because this component of perception guides a 
person when making a decision about which type of action to initiate, and under what 
circumstances, it is influenced both by visual information, and information regarding the 
person’s bodily capabilities (Witt & Proffitt, 2007). Explicit awareness of a hill is captured 
via measures that require a person to verbally indicate the number of degrees, or to adjust a 
metal plate to match the hill’s incline. Verbal and visual measures are related to the planning 
of undertaking the action of climbing, for which lack or availability of resources are taken 
into account. Accordingly, these measures yield overestimations of hill slant and are 
influenced by a person’s bodily resources (e.g. Proffitt et al., 1995, Bhalla & Proffitt, 1999). 
In contrast, visual perception that guides behavior is not influenced by bodily resources but 
only by the spatial characteristics of the environment (Glover, 2004) because it is involved in 
action execution controlled by the dorsal stream (Milner & Goodale, 1995; Creem & Proffitt, 
2001). Indeed, measuring hill slant haptically, which involves adjusting a movable palm-
board to be parallel to the hill’s surface without looking at one’s hand, yields fairly accurate 
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estimates because it captures the role of perception to correctly coordinate a person’s bodily 
movements to climb the hill (Witt & Proffitt, 2007).1 Visual perception that guides behavior 
is therefore functionally different from visual perception involved in explicit awareness 
because it controls action execution, and not action planning. 
Given that we reasoned that approach and avoidance are cues related to undertaking a 
behavior afforded by the hill and therefore influence action planning, we expected the 
hypothesized effects of arm position for people in good physical condition only on the verbal 
and visual measures. In contrast, no effect was predicted for the haptic measure of slant 
because it captures perceptual processes that guide action execution. 
Method 
Participants. Fifty-four participants were recruited from passersby at Castle Mound, 
Cambridge, using convenience sampling. They were randomly assigned to either the 
approach or avoidance condition (54% male; Mage = 28.15 years; SD = 8.35). Data from two 
participants were excluded because of failure to follow instructions.  
Stimulus. A steep section (39°) of the hill was used because inclines steeper than 30° 
are considered challenging to climb (Proffitt et al., 1995).  
Procedure. Participants were instructed to stand at a level surface facing the hill and 
assume either arm flexion (i.e., approach) or arm extension (i.e., avoidance). Arm flexion 
(Figure 1) involved pressing the metal bar of a step ladder positioned on participants’ left side 
from below with their left arm slightly extended, whereas extension (Figure 2) involved using 
the arm to press the bar from above (Cacioppo et al., 1993). While assuming the arm position, 
participants estimated hill slant explicitly, via the verbal and visual measures, and implicitly, 
via the haptic measure. The verbal estimate involved orally reporting hill slant in degrees; the 
visual estimate involved regulating a metal disc that consisted of an adjustable plate 
representing hill surface and a fixed plate representing the ground; the haptic estimate 
APPROACH AND SLANT PERCEPTION                                                                           10 
involved using the right hand to adjust a movable wooden board to be parallel to the hill’s 
surface (visual and haptic measures are depicted in Schnall et al., 2008; Schnall et al., 2010). 
The order of measurement was counterbalanced across participants and they were allowed to 
rest their left arm between each measurement if necessary. However, they always assumed 
the arm position during slant estimates. In contrast to previous hill studies, the visual 
estimation task was not performed by participants themselves because the manipulated arm 
position prevented them from using both hands. Instead, the experimenter stood in front of 
participants such that both the disc and the hill section were visible. He gradually moved the 
adjustable plate from the 90° position towards the 0° position, and participants instructed him 
when to stop, or further directed him to move the plate upwards or downwards until satisfied.  
Then participants completed a follow-up questionnaire assessing mood (happy, anxious, 
stressed, depressed, angry, and sad) on a scale from “1=not at all” to “5=a great degree”. 
Mood influenced hill slant perception in a previous study (Riener et al., 2011) and was thus 
measured as potential confound. Furthermore, the questionnaire assessed participants’ 
physical condition on the experimental day on a scale from “1=very unwell” to “5=excellent”. 
Finally, participants were debriefed and probed for suspicion regarding the study objective. 
No participant reported any insight into the purpose of the hand movement, or the hypothesis.  
Results 
Overall effects of arm position on slant perception. One-way ANOVAs with arm 
position as a between-subjects factor were conducted. For the verbal measure, flexion (M = 
63.77, SD = 9.57) led to steeper slant estimates than extension (M = 57.65, SD = 11.20), F(1, 
50) = 4.48, p = .039, ηp2 = .08. Similarly, for the visual measure, flexion (M = 63.46, SD = 
7.21) yielded steeper slant estimates than extension (M = 58.31, SD = 8.71), F(1, 50) = 5.41, 
p = .024, ηp2 = .10. As predicted, no significant effect was obtained for the haptic measure, 
F(1, 50) = 0.50, p = .482, ηp2 = .01.  
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Slant perception at different levels of physical condition. To assess whether arm 
position influenced slant perception primarily for participants in good physical condition, we 
computed the interaction between arm position and physical condition on experimental day 
by specifying the model in the ANOVA. Furthermore, we performed simple effects analyses 
investigating the effects of arm position on slant perception for participants in poor (-1 SD) 
and good (+1 SD) physical condition. For the verbal measure, the interaction was not 
significant, F(1, 48) = 0.25, p = .621, ηp2 = .01.2 However, in line with predictions, simple 
effects analyses showed that flexion led to marginally steeper slant estimates compared to 
extension for participants in good, p = .068, but not in poor physical condition, p = .251 (see 
Figure 3 for means). For the visual measure, the interaction between arm position and 
physical condition also did not reach the conventional significance level, F(1, 48) = 2.62, p 
= .112, ηp2 = .05. However, simple effects analyses again showed that flexion resulted in 
higher slant estimates compared to extension for participants in good, p = .006, but not in 
poor physical condition, p = .583. Finally, for the haptic measure, the interaction effect was 
not significant, F(1, 48) = 0.04, p = .837, ηp2 < .01, nor simple effects for participants in poor, 
p = .530, or good physical condition, p = .739.  
Confounding effects. To investigate whether mood had an effect, we conducted the 
analyses investigating overall effects of arm position on slant perception as well as the effects 
for participants in poor and good physical condition while controlling for mood as a 
covariate.3 All the effects obtained in the main analyses remained robust, thus indicating that 
mood did not confound the results.  
Discussion 
Overall, the findings of Experiment 1 support the hypothesis that approach cues 
increase perceived hill slant compared to avoidance cues. This was primarily the case for 
participants in good physical condition, for whom acting on the hill by climbing was a 
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realistic possibility. For both the verbal and visual measure, such participants found the hill to 
be steeper when performing arm flexion, as if pulling, than when performing arm extension, 
as if pushing. Participants’ mood did not account for the findings. In contrast, and as expected, 
for the haptic measure no effects of arm position were obtained.  
Experiment 2 
The second experiment extended the approach of Experiment 1 by testing whether, for 
participants in good physical condition, approach cues influence slant perception not only 
compared to avoidance cues, but also compared to a relative absence of action or inaction 
cues. Hence, we included a control condition in which participants did not undergo any 
experimental manipulation. Moreover, we wanted to investigate whether approach influences 
how people view hills relative to avoidance not only when elicited via motor movements but 
also when elicited via a cognitive manipulation, such as mindset priming (Bargh & Chartrand, 
2000). Thus, we used Friedman and Förster’s (2001, 2005) maze task to induce approach and 
avoidance. This task involves virtual enactment of approach and avoidance behaviors and 
influences cognitive processing. For example, approach versus avoidance induced by the 
maze task influence creativity, analytical reasoning, and the scope of perceptual and 
conceptual attention in similar ways as arm flexion and extension (Friedman & Förster, 2000, 
2001, 2002, 2005, 2010; Förster, Friedman, Özelsel, & Denzler, 2006).    
Method 
Participants. Fifty-eight participants were recruited at the site of Experiment 1 and 
randomly assigned to the control, approach, or avoidance condition (60% male; Mage = 32.21 
years; SD = 12.18). Data from one participant were excluded because she was familiar with 
the incline of the hill. 
Procedure. All participants except for those in the control condition first solved the 
maze task. Participants in the approach condition were instructed to help a mouse at the 
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center of the maze to find the way out to reach a cheese, whereas those in the avoidance 
condition helped the mouse to escape from an owl. Immediately after the task, participants 
estimated hill slant using the identical procedure as in Experiment 1, except that they 
themselves adjusted the disk for the visual measure. Then participants completed the follow-
up questionnaire assessing their mood and physical condition on the experimental day as in 
Experiment 1. Finally, they were debriefed and probed for suspicion. No participant reported 
any insight into the purpose of the hand movement, or the hypothesis. 
Results 
Overall effects of the maze task on slant perception. One-way ANOVAs with 
condition as a between-subjects factor were conducted. For the verbal measure, a significant 
effect of condition was found, F(2, 54) = 5.24, p = .008, ηp2  = .16. Planned contrasts showed 
that approach (M = 64.42, SD = 12.59) led to steeper slant estimates than avoidance (M = 
51.79, SD = 11.03), t(54) = 3.20, p = .002, d = 0.87, or control condition (M = 56.42, SD = 
12.82), t(54) = 2.03, p = .048, d = 0.55. The latter two conditions did not differ, t(54) = 1.17, 
p = .246, d = 0.32. Similarly, the effect of condition was significant for the visual measure, 
F(2, 54) = 4.51, p = .015, ηp2 = .14. Approach (M = 60.32, SD = 9.32) again produced higher 
slant estimates than avoidance (M = 51.58, SD = 9.86), t(54) = 2.96, p = .005, d = 0.81, or 
control condition (M = 54.68, SD = 7.98), t(54) = 1.91, p = .061, d = 0.52. However, the latter 
two conditions did not differ, t(54) = 1.05, p = .297, d = 0.29. As predicted, no effect of 
condition was found for the haptic measure, F(2, 54) = 1.14, p = .328, ηp2 = .04.  
Slant perception at different levels of physical condition. To assess whether the 
maze task influenced slant perception only for participants in good physical condition, we 
computed the interaction between condition and physical condition on experimental day and 
performed simple effects analyses as in Experiment 1. For the verbal measure, the interaction 
effect was significant, F(2, 51) = 3.89, p = .027, ηp2 = .13. For participants in good physical 
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condition (+1 SD), approach led to steeper slant estimates than avoidance, p < .001, or control 
condition, p = .004 (see Figure 4 for means), whereas the latter two conditions did not differ, 
p = .195. However, for participants in poor physical condition (-1 SD), slant estimates did not 
differ between conditions, all ps > .481. For the visual measure, the interaction was also 
significant, F(2, 51) = 3.51, p = .037, ηp2 = .12. For participants in good physical condition, 
approach again yielded higher slant estimates compared to the avoidance, p < .001, or control 
condition, p = .026. Furthermore, the control condition led to marginally higher slant 
estimates compared to the avoidance condition, p = .053. However, for participants in poor 
physical condition, slant estimates did not differ between conditions, all ps > .622. Finally, 
the interaction was not significant for the haptic measure, F(2, 51) = 0.31, p = .733, ηp2 = .01, 
and there were no significant differences between any of the conditions for participants in 
either good or poor physical condition, all ps > .179.  
Confounding effects. Potential effects of mood were investigated as in Experiment 1. 
All the effects obtained in the main analyses remained robust after controlling for mood.4  
Discussion 
Overall, the findings of Experiment 2 replicated the findings of Experiment 1 by 
showing that, for participants in good physical condition, approach induced via a mindset 
priming procedure influenced slant perception analogously to approach induced via motor 
movements. Moreover, the approach condition yielded higher slant estimates compared to the 
control condition, indicating that participants who approach steep hills see them as even 
steeper compared to those not primed by any approach or avoidance cues. Important for our 
hypothesis, these effects were not obtained for participants in poor physical condition. 
Controlling for participants’ mood again showed the findings to hold regardless of affective 
feelings.  
Experiment 3 
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Next we investigated the mechanism behind the previous findings. If approach 
manipulations influenced slant perception because they indeed implicitly evoked climbing, 
then such manipulations should yield identical slant estimates when administered either alone 
or with explicit instructions specifying climbing. Furthermore, if participants are told that the 
experiment would involve no climbing, approach should yield lower slant estimates because 
the implied meaning of approach is invalidated. These predictions should occur only for 
participants in good physical condition because they possess the necessary resources to climb 
the hill. To test these predictions, we included three conditions in which all participants 
solved the maze task inducing approach as in Experiment 2. Additionally, in one condition, 
participants were given no instructions regarding climbing, as in the previous experiments; in 
another condition, participants were told that the experiment would involve climbing, and 
they could choose how much of the hill they wished to climb; in the third condition, 
participants were told that the experiment would involve no climbing. 
Because we argue that steep hills are seen as steeper when approached due to the 
adaptive role of perception in discouraging costly behaviors, we also assessed participants’ 
climbing propensity at the end of the study. This variable comprised various aspects of 
participants’ aptitude to climb the hill, such as the perceived difficulty of climbing and their 
motivation to climb. If participants in good physical condition are indeed discouraged from 
climbing after solving the maze without instructions or additionally receiving explicit 
instructions evoking climbing, then they should report lower climbing propensity than 
participants told that climbing will not occur.   
Because all conditions in Experiment 3 involved approach, we expected that the effects 
may be more difficult to detect than in the previous two experiments. Thus, we recruited a 
relatively larger sample to ensure sufficient power to test our predictions.  
Method 
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Participants. One hundred fifty participants were recruited at the site of Experiments 1 
and 2 and randomly assigned to the approach and climb, approach and no climb, and 
approach without instructions conditions (65% male; Mage=27.60 years; SD=6.92). Data from 
nine participants were excluded: Five did not complete the maze task, three failed to comply 
with instructions, and one was familiar with the incline of the hill.  
Procedure. All participants first completed the consent form with background 
information containing a question assessing their physical condition on experimental day on a 
scale from “1=very poor” to “6=excellent”. Thereafter, they were given a brief overview of 
the experiment. All participants were told that the main task would involve estimating the 
slant of the hill. Participants in the approach and climb condition were further told that they 
would be asked to climb the hill at the end of the experiment, and could climb any proportion 
of the hill ranging from not climbing at all to climbing all the way up. Participants in the 
approach and no climb condition were explicitly told that the experiment would involve no 
climbing. Furthermore, those in the approach without instructions condition were not given 
any further details regarding climbing.  
Then all participants completed the approach maze and estimated the slant of the hill as 
in Experiment 2. They further completed a questionnaire assessing their climbing propensity 
(energy and effort required to climb up, how difficult, risky, and pleasant it would be to climb 
up, and motivation to climb the hill) on a scale from “1=disagree strongly” to “7=agree very 
strongly”.5 The questionnaire also assessed three basic dimensions of affect, pleasure-
displeasure, awake-tiredness, and tension-relaxation on a scale from “1=very slightly or not 
at all” to “5=extremely” (Schimmack & Grob, 2000). Finally, all participants were debriefed, 
and those in the approach and climb condition were told that they would not have to climb 
the hill. No participant reported any insight into the hypothesis. 
Results 
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Overall effects of experimental manipulations on slant perception. One-way 
ANOVAs with condition as a between-subjects factor were performed. For the verbal 
measure, a marginally significant effect of the experimental manipulation was found, F(2, 
138) = 2.40,  p = .094, ηp2  = .03. Planned contrasts showed that the approach and no climb 
condition (M = 48.46, SD = 12.06) produced lower slant estimates than the approach without 
instructions (M = 53.61, SD = 11.57), t(138) = 2.11, p = .036, d = 0.36, or the approach and 
climb condition (M = 52.21, SD = 11.80), although the latter difference did not reach 
statistical significance, t(138) = 1.55, p = .124, d = 0.26. As expected, slant estimates for the 
latter two conditions were relatively similar, t(138) = 0.57, p = .570, d = 0.10, thus suggesting 
that approach without instructions implicitly evoked climbing. For the visual measure, there 
was a significant effect of experimental manipulation, F(2, 138) = 5.87,  p = .004, ηp2  = .08. 
Further, the approach and no climb condition (M = 45.27, SD = 8.88) yielded less steep slant 
estimates than the approach without instructions (M = 50.57, SD = 9.47), t(138) = 2.86, p 
= .005, d = 0.49, or the approach and climb condition (M = 50.87, SD = 8.51), t(138) = 3.05, 
p = .003, d = 0.52. Furthermore, the latter two conditions did not differ, t(138) = 0.17, p 
= .869, d = 0.03, again suggesting that approach without instructions implicitly evoked 
climbing. Finally, there was no effect of condition on the haptic measure, F(2, 138) = 0.26,  p 
= .769, ηp2  < .01. 
Slant perception at different levels of physical condition. To assess whether the 
approach and no climb condition differed from the other two conditions primarily for 
participants in good physical condition, we used the same procedure as in the previous two 
experiments.6 For the verbal measure, the interaction between experimental manipulation and 
physical condition was marginally significant, F(2, 128) = 2.99, p = .054, ηp2 = .05. As 
predicted, for participants in good physical condition (+1 SD), the approach and no climb 
condition led to lower slant estimates than the approach without instructions, p = .007, or the 
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approach and climb condition, p = .004 (see Figure 5 for means). However, the latter two 
conditions did not differ, p = .886, supporting the prediction that approach yields identical 
slant estimates when climbing is implicitly or explicitly evoked but not when it will not 
happen. For participants in poor physical condition (-1 SD), no differences between 
conditions occurred, all ps > .408.  For the visual measure, the interaction between 
experimental manipulation and physical condition was marginally significant, F(2, 128) = 
2.64, p = .075, ηp2 = .04. For participants in good physical condition, the approach and no 
climb condition again yielded lower slant estimates than the approach and climb, p < .001, or 
the approach without instructions condition, p = .002, whereas the latter two conditions did 
not differ, p = .797 (see Figure 5 for means). Thus, approach again yielded identical slant 
estimates when climbing was implicitly or explicitly evoked but not when it was ruled out. 
For participants in poor physical condition, we found no differences between conditions, all 
ps > .314. Finally, for the haptic measure, the interaction effect was not significant, F(2, 128) 
= 0.52, p = .596, ηp2 = .01, and experimental conditions did not differ for participants in either 
poor or good physical condition, all ps > .198.  
Propensity to climb the hill. In this set of analyses, we investigated whether 
participants in good physical condition indeed experienced higher propensity to climb the hill 
when in the approach and no climb condition compared to the other two conditions. 
Therefore, we computed the interaction between experimental conditions and physical 
condition on experimental day and investigated the effects for participants in poor (-1 SD) 
and good physical condition (+1 SD) as in the previous analyses. The interaction term was 
marginally significant, F(2, 128) = 2.70, p = .072, ηp2 = .04. For participants in good physical 
condition, the approach and no climb condition yielded higher climbing propensity compared 
to the approach and climb, p = .001, or the approach without instructions condition, p = .036 
(see Figure 6 for means). As predicted, the latter two conditions did not differ, p = .348. For 
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participants in poor physical condition, no differences between the conditions were found, all 
ps > .566. 
Climbing propensity and slant perception.  
Given that we claim that perception discourages behavior, a direct test would be to 
show that verbal and visual slant estimates mediate the influence of experimental conditions 
on climbing propensity, but only for people in good physical condition. The first step would 
thus be to show that, for people in good physical condition, experimental condition influences 
verbal and visual slant estimates as potential mediators (Hayes, 2013). This is what the 
reported analyses indeed showed. The second step requires showing that the influence of 
experimental conditions on climbing propensity for people in good physical condition 
disappears when either verbal or visual slant estimates are included in the analysis as a 
covariate, one at a time, because they themselves predict climbing propensity. Although we 
did perform such analyses, neither verbal, F(1, 127) = 0.13, p = .722, ηp2 < .01, nor visual 
slant estimates, F(1, 127) = 1.46, p = .229, ηp2 = .01, predicted climbing propensity, and the 
previously observed effects of experimental conditions on climbing propensity for people in 
good physical condition remained similar. 
  We believe that the negative relationship between slant estimates and climbing 
propensity necessary for mediated effects may not have been observed because of the dual 
role that climbing propensity played in the experiment: Although we assessed climbing 
propensity as the dependent variable, it is likely that this variable was also a moderator. It is 
possible that experimental conditions influenced slant perception, which in turn discouraged 
climbing, but only for participants who were high in climbing propensity at the beginning of 
the experiment. Therefore, the two conditions that implied climbing might have increased 
slant estimates and decreased climbing propensity compared to the no climb condition only 
for people who were initially high in climbing propensity. If this were indeed the case, the 
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expected negative correlation between slant estimates and climbing propensity would have 
been observed only if participants initially high in climbing propensity were so discouraged 
from climbing after perceiving the hill as steeper that they reported lower climbing 
propensity than participants who were initially not inclined towards climbing.  However, the 
fact that neither verbal nor visual estimates predicted climbing propensity in the mediation 
analysis suggests that this was not the case. 
Therefore, a more plausible possibility is that the discouragement from climbing that 
people initially high in climbing propensity experienced in the two conditions that implied 
climbing versus the no climb condition was of a smaller magnitude, and their climbing 
propensity remained relatively high compared to participants initially not inclined towards 
climbing. To investigate this possibility, we performed analyses testing whether climbing 
propensity moderated the effects of experimental conditions. Indeed, climbing propensity 
interacted with experimental conditions in influencing verbal, F(2, 135) = 7.17, p = .001, ηp2 
= .10, and visual slant estimates, F(2, 135) = 5.29, p = .006, ηp2 = .07, with the hypothesized 
differences between the experimental conditions occurring only for participants high in 
climbing propensity (+1 SD). This suggests that participants who may have experienced 
strongest discouragement from climbing because of being initially high in climbing 
propensity still reported relatively high climbing propensity scores later.    
Therefore, the discouraging effect that visual perception had on climbing would best 
be captured by investigating correlations between climbing propensity and slant estimates for 
participants who reported relatively high climbing propensity scores. Indeed, participants 
with low climbing propensity scores within this category may be those who were discouraged 
from climbing after seeing the hill as relatively steeper, whereas participants with high 
climbing propensity scores within this category may be those who were not discouraged from 
climbing because they saw the hill as relatively less steep. Therefore, the negative correlation 
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between climbing propensity and slant estimates should be observed within this category of 
participants. 
 To investigate this possibility, we split participants into three groups according to 
their climbing propensity by using the SPSS subcommand NTILES, where group one (N = 45) 
consisted of low climbing propensity participants (lower than 33rd percentile), group two (N 
= 53) of medium climbing propensity participants (between 33rd and 67th percentile), and 
group three (N = 43) of high climbing propensity participants (higher than 67th percentile). 
Furthermore, for each group we performed zero order correlations between climbing 
propensity and verbal, visual, and haptic estimates. In line with our predictions, strong 
negative correlations between climbing propensity and verbal and visual estimates occurred 
only in the group where climbing propensity was relatively high, whereas correlations in 
other groups were weak and not significant (see Table 1). These findings suggest that 
perception discouraged climbing only for people who were initially likely to climb up and for 
whom discouraging behavior was therefore adaptive. 
Confounding effects. To investigate whether affect played a role, we repeated all the 
previous analyses while controlling for each basic dimension of affect as a covariate — 
pleasure-displeasure, awake-tiredness, and tension-relaxation — one at a time. These 
analyses revealed that all the effects remained robust, and were thus not confounded by 
affect.7 
Discussion 
Overall, the findings of Experiment 3 supported the hypothesis that implicit approach 
cues affect slant perception only when there is a possibility of climbing. More specifically, 
participants in good physical condition, who thus possessed more energetic resources for 
climbing, saw the hill as steeper when the approach maze either implicitly or explicitly 
evoking climbing, but not when it was made clear that no climbing would be performed.  In 
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other words, engaging in approach without additional instructions, or with specific 
instructions that the action was impending had the same effect. Thus, the approach 
manipulation indeed influenced slant perception because of being implicitly associated with 
the behavior of climbing afforded by the hill.  
We argue that approach makes steep hills appear even steeper because of the functional 
role of visual perception in discouraging the energetically costly behavior of climbing. Indeed, 
the findings showed that experimental manipulations that led to increased slant perception 
also led to lower climbing propensity: Participants who solved the approach maze and were 
in good physical condition reported lower propensity to climb the hill when given explicit 
instructions evoking climbing or when given no instructions compared to when told that the 
study would involve no climbing. Thus, when climbing the hill was expected, participants in 
good physical condition on average reported being more discouraged from climbing 
compared to when no climbing was expected. Further correlation analyses showed that verbal 
and visual slant estimates were negatively related to climbing propensity only for participants 
who scored relatively high on the latter construct (above 67th percentile). This suggests that 
perception discouraged climbing only for participants who may have initially been more 
inclined towards climbing and for whom discouragement was therefore adaptive.  
General Discussion 
In the present article, we argue that physically demanding hills are perceived as even 
steeper when the act of climbing is impending. In line with the economy of action approach 
(Proffitt, 2006), we propose that this perceptual change may function to discourage 
energetically costly behaviors. To manipulate the behavior of climbing, we used approach 
versus avoidance cues that signal undertaking a behavior afforded by perceived stimuli versus 
refraining from this behavior. Experiments 1 and 2 showed that approach induced through a 
motor movement (Cacioppo et al., 1993) or a mindset priming procedure (Friedman & 
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Förster, 2001, 2005) indeed leads to steeper slant estimates compared to avoidance. This 
effect occurred only for people in good physical condition, who are in general more likely to 
undertake costly behaviors such as climbing (Eves, 2013), and for whom perception could 
therefore potentially discourage behavior. These findings remained robust after controlling 
for participants’ affective state.  
To ascertain that approach indeed influenced slant perception because it implies 
climbing, Experiment 3 investigated whether this influence disappears when climbing is not 
required. Indeed, participants in good physical condition who completed the approach maze 
but were told that the study involved no climbing saw the hill as less steep than those who 
solved the maze either with, or without explicit instructions that climbing would be required. 
Thus, the approach cue on its own had the same effect as when combined with instructions 
that climbing was involved. However, the effect of the approach cue disappeared when 
climbing was explicitly ruled out. Thus, the present research expands the current knowledge 
about the economy of action account (e.g. Proffitt, 2006) by showing that evoking an action 
can influence the perception of the environment for people with similar levels of bodily 
potential. 
Finally, because we have argued that steep hills are perceived as steeper when 
approached due to the functional role of perception to discourage costly behaviors, 
Experiment 3 further investigated whether approach makes participants in good physical 
condition less discouraged from climbing when it has been explicitly ruled out. Indeed, these 
participants reported higher climbing propensity when in the approach and no climb 
condition compared to the approach and climb or the approach without instructions condition, 
whereas the latter two conditions did not differ. These findings suggest that people who are 
able to climb steep hills not only  perceive their slant as more extreme, but also report lower 
climbing propensity than those without an option to climb up. However, we were unable to 
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establish slant estimates as a mediator of the influence of experimental conditions on 
climbing propensity, arguably because of the complex role that this variable played in the 
experiment. Instead, we showed that verbal and visual slant estimates were negatively related 
to climbing propensity only for participants who scored high on the latter variable (above 
67th percentile). This suggests that perception directly discouraged climbing only for 
participants who initially had a higher tendency to climb up and for whom discouraging the 
costly behavior was therefore adaptive. 
Although physical condition on the experimental day was shown to be an important 
moderator across the three experiments we conducted, a critic may argue that this variable 
tapped into participants’ subjective mental states rather than objectively measuring their 
physical fitness. However, we propose that capturing participants’ subjective states is equally 
or more relevant because such states may assess their ability to perform costly actions in the 
given situation. On the contrary, objectively measured physical fitness may not reliably 
capture participants’ situational potential to perform costly actions. For example, a participant 
may in general be physically fit but feel somewhat out of sorts on a particular day. Therefore, 
we propose that measuring participants’ physical condition using a questionnaire item rather 
than a more objective measure is an advantage rather than a disadvantage when it comes to 
the present research. However, we acknowledge that using such a measure may make the 
present research less directly comparable to Bhalla & Proffitt (1999) because they either 
manipulated physical condition experimentally or used objective measures such as the resting 
heart rate or body mass index to assess it.      
Another important consideration is whether approach leads to inflated slant estimates 
compared to avoidance primarily for steep hills or this applies more broadly to a range of 
hills. Our research involved only a relatively steep hill (39°), so we do not know to what 
extent approach and avoidance would influence the perception of less steep hills. However, in 
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line with the logic employed in inferring the hypothesis for the present research, we consider 
it unlikely that similar effects would occur for less challenging hills because they do not pose 
an equal threat to energetic resources. However, the exact cut-off point at which this 
influence stops will need to be determined by future research.        
Demand Characteristics 
Besides testing the specific research question related to approaching steep hills, the 
present findings also help us address the recent criticism of research showing effects of effort 
on slant perception. Durgin et al. (2009) and Durgin, Klein, Spiegel, Strawser, & Williams 
(2012) have criticized some of the previous hill studies in which participants wore a heavy 
backpack intended to reduce participants’ potential to act on the hill (e.g. Bhalla & Proffitt, 
1999; Schnall et al., 2010) for being susceptible to demand characteristics (Orne, 1962). 
These authors have argued that participants may have recognized that the purpose of the 
backpack was to make the hill appear steeper, and thus they adjusted responses accordingly. 
Durgin and colleagues thus question the validity and generalizability of previous hill studies. 
The findings from the three experiments are informative in that respect, because they cannot 
be explained by experimental demand characteristics. Indeed, the manipulations involving 
arm position and the maze task were unlikely to be connected to approach or avoidance by 
participants. In post-experimental probing no participants could correctly identify what the 
manipulations involved, let alone infer the hypothesis that approach should lead to higher 
estimates compared to the avoidance or control conditions. Thus, the current results cannot be 
explained by experimental demand characteristics.  
Alternative Explanations and Future Directions 
To establish that our theoretical explanation behind the findings is indeed the most 
plausible one, it is necessary to examine alternative explanations frequently associated with 
approach and avoidance motivational orientations. The present findings can be alternatively 
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explained if we consider the concept of affective incoherence (Clore & Schnall, 2008). This 
concept denotes that incongruence between motivational orientation and properties of 
external stimuli creates an epistemic problem that interferes with on-going cognitive 
processing. For example, incongruence between avoidance evoked by arm extension and 
positive words primed through a scrambled sentences task creates an underlying cognitive 
conflict that impedes memory for a subsequent story (Centerbar, Schnall, Clore, & Garvin, 
2008).   
Because approach cues such as arm flexion can also be interpreted as signals for safe 
environments rich in resources (Friedman & Förster, 2010), they may be incongruent with 
environments such as steep hills affording energetically consuming actions. Thus, one 
possibility is that in the present research this incongruence between approach cues and the 
hill created an underlying cognitive conflict, which, in turn, might have inflated slant 
estimates analogously to other psychological burdens (Slepian, Masicampo, Toosi, & 
Ambady, 2012). However, this explanation is unlikely to account for the present findings. If 
climbing is more costly for participants in poor versus good physical condition, then the 
former would experience a stronger cognitive conflict when performing an approach cue. 
Thus, the differences between the approach and avoidance or control conditions would be 
even stronger for participants in poor physical condition. Furthermore, in Experiment 3, these 
participants would report greater differences in climbing propensity between conditions than 
participants in good physical condition. However, in all the three experiments we found no 
effects of experimental manipulations for participants in poor physical condition. Thus, our 
explanation regarding perception as a bodily mechanism that discourages costly actions 
signaled by approach cues seems more plausible than the incongruence explanation. 
In conclusion, our finding suggests that motor or cognitive cues for performing actions 
in an environment that affords costly behaviors can influence the perception of such an 
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environment. Future research will need to explore further whether the direction of this 
influence changes when costly behaviors serve as means for acquiring a resource and are thus 
associated with energetic benefits rather than costs. Such an approach has the potential to 
yield new insights into the nature of human agency, to clarify how different bodily states or 
cognitive concepts guide actions relative to the affordances that are present in everyday 
physical and social environments.   
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Footnotes 
1 Taylor-Covill and Eves (2013a) recently showed that the haptic measure of hill slant does 
not generally yield lower and more accurate slant estimates compared to the verbal or visual 
measures because of constraints in arm wrist movement, as critics have contended (Durgin, 
Hajnal, Li, Tonge, and Stigliani, 2010, 2011). They constructed an improved haptic measure 
in which the plate moved by participants’ hand when estimating hill slant is adjusted to a 
pendulum that does not impose any constraints on wrist movement. Further, they showed that 
this measure captures the identical perceptual process as the more traditional haptic measure 
used in our study and previous hill studies. Furthermore, Taylor-Covill and Eves (2013b) 
used the improved haptic measure to assess the effects of fatigue and gender on slant 
perception. In line with previous hill studies using the traditional haptic measure, these 
variables influenced slant estimates only for the verbal and visual measure but not for the 
haptic measure. Thus, haptic measures do indeed yield different slant estimates compared to 
the verbal and visual measure because they capture a different perceptual process that cannot 
be explained by limitations of the experimental equipment. 
2 It is possible that, unlike in Experiments 2 and 3, the interactions between experimental 
conditions and physical condition did not reach conventional significance levels in 
Experiment 1 because a large number of participants gave identical response regarding their 
physical condition. Indeed, 63.5% participants answered that they felt physically good on the 
experimental day, whereas the next most prevalent response was “excellent” with 19.2%. 
Thus, it may be that this relative prevalence of one response in the moderator variable 
decreased the power of statistical analyses to capture the overall interaction effect.          
3 Mood items were combined into a composite score, with happiness reverse coded (α = .84). 
Arm flexion remained significantly different from arm extension for the verbal, F(1, 49) = 
5.96, p = .018, ηp2 = .11, and the visual measure, F(1, 49) = 7.28, p = .010, ηp2 = .13. For 
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participants in good physical condition flexion remained different from extension for the 
visual measure, p = .005, and marginally different for the verbal measure, p = .055. However, 
for those in poor physical condition the two conditions did not differ for verbal, p = .157, or 
visual estimates, p = .395.   
4 Items assessing mood were analyzed after being combined into a composite score (α = .86) 
as in Experiment 1. Main effects on the verbal measure, F(2, 53) = 4.99, p = .010, ηp2 =0.16, 
and the visual measure, F(2, 53) = 4.35, p = .018, ηp2 =0.14, remained significant. For 
participants in good physical condition the approach condition remained significantly 
different from the control, p = .004, and the avoidance condition, p = .001, for the verbal 
measure. Again, no differences were obtained for participants in poor physical condition, all 
ps > .502. For the visual measure, approach yielded higher slant estimates than control, p 
= .028, or avoidance, p < .001, for participants in good physical condition. No differences 
were obtained for participants in poor physical condition, all ps > .625. 
5 The items assessing climbing propensity were: I feel it would be difficult for me to climb 
the section of the hill in front of me; I feel it would take me a lot of energy to climb the 
section of the hill in front of me; I feel it would be physically effortful for me to climb the 
section of the hill in front of me; I feel it would be risky for me to climb the section of the hill 
in front of me; Overall, climbing up the section of the hill would be a pleasant experience; 
Overall, I feel motivated to climb the section of the hill. To create an overall index of 
climbing propensity, responses to these six items were combined into a composite score, with 
difficulty, energy, effort, and risk reverse coded (α = .75). 
6 Because seven participants failed to answer the question regarding physical condition, their 
data could not be used for statistical analyses involving this variable, thus leaving forty-five 
participants in the approach and climb condition, forty-five participants in the approach and 
no climb condition, and forty-four participants in the approach without instructions condition.  
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7 Important for our predictions, the approach and no climb condition remained significantly 
different from the approach and climb or the approach without instructions condition for 
people in good physical condition for both the verbal and visual measure, all ps < .011. 
However, the letter two conditions did not differ, all ps > .816. Furthermore, for people in 
poor physical condition, no significant differences between experimental conditions were 
obtained, all ps > .312. The differences in climbing propensity between the approach and no 
climb condition and the approach and climb or the approach without instructions condition 
remained significant for people in good physical condition, all ps < .035, whereas the latter 
two conditions did not differ, all ps > .320. Furthermore, the differences in climbing 
propensity for people in poor physical condition remained insignificant, all ps > .389. Finally, 
verbal and visual estimates remained negatively correlated with climbing propensity for 
participants high in climbing propensity (above 67th percentile) when we performed partial 
correlation analyses controlling for each basic dimension of affect, one at a time, all ps < .026.  
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Table 1: Zero order correlations between climbing propensity and slant perception for people 
who scored low (below 33rd percentile), medium (between 33rd and 67th percentile), and high 
(above 67th percentile) on climbing propensity (Experiment 3) 
 
 
 Verbal Visual Haptic 
Low Climbing Propensity    
Climbing Propensity −.005 .009 −.147 
    
Medium Climbing Propensity    
Climbing Propensity −.046 −.099 .020 
  
High Climbing Propensity    
Climbing Propensity −.345* −.415** −.152 
Note: *p = .024; **p = .006 
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Figure 1. Participant performing arm flexion.  
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Figure 2. Participant performing arm extension.  
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Figure 3. Effects of arm position on slant perception for participants in poor (-1 SD) and 
good physical condition (+1 SD) in Experiment 1. The horizontal line corresponds to the real 
hill slant as measured by an inclinometer (39°), whereas error bars correspond to ±1 SE of the 
mean. 
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Figure 4. Effects of the maze task on slant perception for participants in poor (-1 SD) and 
good physical condition (+1 SD) in Experiment 2. The horizontal line corresponds to the real 
hill slant as measured by an inclinometer (39°), whereas error bars correspond to ±1 SE of the 
mean. 
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Figure 5. Effects of experimental manipulation on slant perception for participants in poor (-1 
SD) and good physical condition (+1 SD) in Experiment 3. The horizontal line corresponds to 
the real hill slant as measured by an inclinometer (39°). Error bars correspond to ±1 SE of the 
mean. 
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Figure 6. Effects of experimental manipulation on climbing propensity for participants in 
poor (-1 SD) and good physical condition (+1 SD) in Experiment 3. Error bars correspond to 
±1 SE of the mean.  
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